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Policymakers around the world introduce special policies aimed at attracting foreign direct 
investments (FDI). They motivate their decision by the spillover effect, which FDI have on 
domestic companies. Empirical literature so far has failed to find any robust evidence of this 
effect. In this paper, we make an attempt to explain this finding. Using data from Poland, 
Romania, Russia, and Ukraine, we demonstrate that not all FDI have positive spillover effects on 
domestic firms. Spillovers are positive only in the case of export-oriented FDI and, more 
generally, are driven by the more productive foreign companies. Moreover, effects of FDI on 
domestic firms are not limited to knowledge spillovers: exposure to foreign technologies alters 
the form of their production functions. Specifically, foreign entry is associated with higher 
capital intensity and lower labor intensity of domestic firms in relatively more developed 
countries, such as Poland, while the opposite is the case in the less developed countries, such as 
Russia. These results are subject to threshold effects: benefits are more likely to materialize once 
a relatively large stock of foreign capital is accumulated. Absorptive capacity of domestic firms 
plays a crucial role in reaping the benefits of FDI. Both, knowledge spillovers and production 
function changes, occur predominantly in the more educated and the less corrupt regions. 
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Foreign direct investments (FDI) are widely considered an important catalyst of economic 
development. Both economists and policymakers believe that FDI can improve host countries’ 
technological capacities and managerial style both, because of the direct effect on the companies 
that receive FDI and because of the spillover effect on domestic companies in the same industry 
and in upstream industries through backward linkages. In order to strengthen these effects, 
governments of many developing and transition economies introduce special policies aimed at 
attracting FDI and/or enhancing spillovers and backward linkages. In particular, regulation of 
FDI became one of the key issues for many recently negotiated preferential trade agreements and 
bilateral trade agreements.  
This political enthusiasm is not based on a rigorous economic theory and evidence, 
particularly where the spillover effect is concerned. The rationale for the direct effect of FDI on 
firms’ productivity is that FDI can only be made if the investor has an advantage over local firms 
either because of superior technological knowledge or because of better managerial techniques, 
distributional network, etc. As a result, firms with FDI should usually be more productive than 
domestic firms. This prediction is supported by virtually all empirical studies conducted both for 
developing and developed countries.
4 Empirical studies also show that multinational companies 
usually pay higher wages than domestic ones. Aizenman and Spiegel (2002) argue, however, that 
this phenomenon can partially be explained by the necessity for foreign-owned firms to use 
efficiency wages in the environment characterized by poor contract enforcement and high 
monitoring costs.  
Theoretical justifications for the spillover effect are even weaker. Normally, empirical 
studies of spillovers are motivated by the reference to demonstration effect, and potential for 
labor turnover between foreign-owned and domestic firms. In the case of inter-industry 
spillovers, a theoretical justification of the demonstration effect and transfer of technologies to 
domestic suppliers was provided by Rodrigues-Clare (1996) and Markusen and Venables (1999). 
For intra-industry spillovers this argument remains non-formalized.  
Empirical work on the demonstration effect is complicated by the fact that spillovers of 
technological and managerial techniques are not the only effect that foreign-owned firms can 
exert on domestic ones. Entry of foreigners increases competition, which can have a two-fold 
                                                 
4 The survey of the literature is provided by Lipsey (2004), Lipsey and Sjoholm (2005).    3
effect on domestic firms. On the one hand, foreign firms take away some of the market from 
domestic firms. In the case of increasing return technologies, domestic firms can become less 
efficient as a result. On the other hand, increased competition can push domestic firms to 
improve efficiency and increase their total factor productivity (TFP). This effect can also be 
considered a spillover. However, this spillover is a result of increased effort of workers or 
management, while knowledge spillovers, which we discussed in the beginning, is a positive 
externality.
5 
Given the presence of effects that go in different directions, empirical findings on the 
spillover effect are mixed.
6  An influential paper by Aitken and Harrison (1999) finds no or 
negative spillovers from foreign to domestic firms in Venezuela. At the same time, Kathuria 
(2000) finds positive spillovers in the “scientific” sector of Indian manufacturing and no 
spillovers in the non-scientific sector. A study by Kokko (1994, 1996) suggests that the economy 
and firm-level capacity to absorb technology is an important determinant of the spillover effect. 
This result is confirmed by Takii (2001) and Todo and Miyamoto (2002), who show that positive 
FDI spillovers are more pronounced in the case of firms that conduct their own R&D. In 
addition, Blalock and Gertler (2002) show that plants with more educated workforce derive 
greater benefits from foreign presence. In the case of developed countries, which are supposed to 
have enough absorptive capacity, Perri and Urban (2004) find evidence of the Veblen-
Gerschenkron effect, according to which spillovers depend on the technological gap between 
foreign and domestic firms. In developing countries the effect of the technological gap is unclear. 
In the case of Indonesian firms, for example, Takii (2001) finds a negative effect, while Sjoholm 
(1999) and Blalock and Gertler (2002) find a positive effect. 
Most transition economies are middle-income countries known for their high level of 
education. Therefore, one can imagine that they have a sufficiently good capacity to absorb 
knowledge spillovers. Nonetheless, the evidence concerning intra-industry spillovers in such 
countries is also inconclusive. Yudaeva et al (2003) show that this effect is positive in the case of 
Russian firms, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2004) and Damijan et al (2003) find positive spillovers 
in Romania, while Djankov and Hoekman (2000), Konings (2001) Javorcik and Spatareanu 
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(2004) and Damijan et al (2003) observe negative effects for some other Eastern-European 
countries. The results of Zukowska-Gagelmann (2000) shed some light on the nature of the 
difference: she finds negative spillovers for the most productive Polish firms, located in sectors 
with high levels of competition, and positive spillovers for less productive firms.  
The econometric approach that is typically used to estimate the spillover effect is often 
criticized for ignoring endogeneity of capital and heterogeneity of both foreign and domestic 
firms (Keane (2005)). At the same time, to our knowledge, no paper pays attention to the fact 
that entry of foreign firms can influence not only productivity of domestic firms, but, more 
generally, their production functions. Technological upgrade due to the demonstration effect may 
be visible as a change in total factor productivity (TFP), but it can also reveal itself as a change 
in the production function, in particular, as a change in factor intensities. In this paper, we 
conduct a test for the potential effect of FDI on the production function of domestic companies. 
We find that in Poland foreign presence is associated with higher capital intensity and lower 
labor intensity of domestic firms. In Romania and Ukraine this effect appears insignificant, but in 
Russia the situation is exactly the opposite: domestic firms are more labor-intensive and less 
capital-intensive in sectors and regions where foreign firms are abundant. We also find that the 
effect of FDI on the production function of domestic firms is weaker or non-existent in regions 
with relatively low educational level or high corruption. Interestingly, foreign presence tends to 
have a negative effect on the change in capital-labor ratios of domestic firms. In Poland and 
Romania, this effect is weaker in sectors and regions where foreign firms enjoy the dominant 
position, while in Russia the opposite is the case. These findings point to potential threshold 
effects: as foreign firms get established in host countries, they force domestic firms to adjust in 
ways that depend on economic circumstances of individual countries. Thus, we see more 
beneficial effects in Poland, which is more developed, more open, has better institutions, and, 
consequently, attracts more FDI, than in Russia, which lags behind in these respects. 
We find little evidence of the spillover effect on TFP of domestic firms, given unchanged 
production functions. However, we find positive and significant spillovers from export-oriented 
FDI in Russia (the only country for which we have these data). It has recently been argued in the 
literature (see Moran (2005)) that export-oriented foreign firms are better equipped to generate 
positive spillovers for domestic firms, than those attracted to protected domestic markets. The 
reason is that to be competitive in the international market, export-oriented foreign companies   5
have to use cutting-edge production technologies, while those aiming to supply protected 
domestic markets tend to use knocked-down component kits and second-rate manufacturing 
processes. Our results support this view. We also find, more generally, that productivity of 
domestic firms tends to increase where foreign firms are more productive. In Poland and 
Romania, more productive FDI are also associated with higher capital-labor ratios of domestic 
firms after one year. These results suggest that not only the “quantity”, but also the “quality” of 
FDI matters for the spillover effects on domestic firms. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe our data and provide the 
motivation for our choice of countries. In the second section we present the results of our 
baseline static estimations. In the third section we introduce differences in the institutional and 





We chose four most populous countries of Eastern Europe for our analyses: Russia, Ukraine, 
Poland, and Romania. Besides being the largest in the region, these countries represent a wide 
spectrum in terms of their macroeconomic performance and institutional development. Table 1 
contains a number of economic indicators for these countries, which we selected as potentially 
relevant to enterprise performance. 
Poland is currently the richest of the four. Poland, however, has by far the highest rate of 
unemployment, while also the lowest rate of inflation. The Polish private sector enjoys the most 
domestic credit and the Polish government is ranked by far the best in terms of general 
effectiveness and the rule of law, and the lowest corruption level. However, the cost of starting a 
business and enforcing contracts is fairly high. The cost of starting a business is the lowest in 
Romania, where, interestingly, enforcing contracts is costly and where the private sector gets the 
least domestic credit. The Romanian labor market is fairly inflexible, especially on the hiring 
side, and highly educated workers are in relatively short supply. On the firing side, the least 
flexible market is in Ukraine, which is also the poorest of the four countries. Ukraine ranks 
lowest on government effectiveness and the rule of law and the cost of starting a business and 
corruption there is high. However, the cost of enforcing contracts is relatively moderate in   6
Ukraine and also in Russia. The cost of starting a business in Russia is not too high and the labor 
market there is quite flexible. The Russian stock market, notably, is the most developed among 
the four countries. Yet, Russia ranks very low in terms of the rule of law, where it is on par with 
Ukraine. Its corruption level is on par with Romania, and in between Poland and Ukraine. Russia 
and Ukraine are also much less open to trade and foreign investment, than Poland and Romania. 
We use firm level data for manufacturing companies in these countries for several recent 
years. Our data come from two sources: the national statistical authorities in the case of Russia 
and Ukraine and Amadeus database of Bureau van Dijk in the case of Poland and Romania. The 
data for Russia and Ukraine cover large and medium-sized industrial enterprises, while the data 
for Poland and Romania include also some smaller manufacturing firms.
7 Table 2 gives a sense 
of coverage and the degree of foreign participation.
8 Companies with foreign ownership are 
defined here as those with at least 10% owned by external entities, excluding those registered in 
popular off-shore destinations. This correction is important in our view, as the latter are likely 
domestic companies and therefore should be regarded as potential destination for, rather than 
source of, spillovers. In the case of Ukraine we also excluded companies owned by Russians or 
representatives of other New Independent States (NIS). These countries share a common past, 
and, therefore, technological level and managerial quality in Ukraine, Russia and other NIS is 
roughly equal. Our primary interest in this paper is spillovers from foreign companies to the 
domestic ones, which originate because of differences in technological levels and managerial 
practices. Given similarities between NIS, such spillovers between companies from these 
countries can only be very small.  
The company data on Russia, Poland and Romania include turnover, material costs, fixed 
capital, and the number of employees, in addition to ownership information. In the Russian data 
material costs are reported as percentage of turnover. In the case of Ukraine, information about 
fixed capital and material costs is absent. Instead of value added in the Ukrainian regressions we 
use real output. Hence, the results for Ukraine are not directly comparable with the results for 
other countries. We define value added for each company as turnover minus material costs. For 
                                                 
7 For Poland and Romania, we used the data for Amadeus top 1,5 million firms, which include firms that satisfy at 
least one of the following size criteria: operating revenue equal to at least €1 million, total assets equal to at least €2 
million, number of employees equal to at least 15. 
8 In what follows, we use fewer companies than appear in Table 2, as some of them were missing the necessary 
balance sheet items. Also, we cleaned the data of outliers, identified as those with value added, labor, and capital in 
either the top or the bottom percentiles (we did this for both the levels and the growth rates of these variables).   7
lack of industry specific deflators, the balance sheet data in Poland, Romania and Ukraine are 
expressed in current US dollars. In Russia they are deflated with industry-specific deflators. An 
important caveat concerning our ownership information is that Amadeus provides only the latest 
available shareholder data for each company. Therefore, in the case of Poland and Romania we 
have to assume that ownership remained unchanged during the sample period. This assumption 
should be kept in mind when interpreting our results.
9  
Poland, Romania and Ukraine use the same industrial classification NACE, while Russian 
OKONH classification, which was used during the period under consideration, is very different. 
For each Russian firm, however, we have a list of activities that it performs. This list of activities 
uses a classification, which is very similar to NACE. The only problem is that there are several 
activities listed for each firm. We use the first activity from the list, considering it the primary 
activity. We exclude a number of firms that listed a non-manufacturing occupation as their major 
NACE industry. For both Russia and Ukraine we have information not only on manufacturing 
industries, but also on some natural resource extracting industries. In what follows we exclude 





We begin by estimating a Cobb-Douglas production function for each country, including a 
dummy variable for firms with foreign participation. We allow the factor shares to vary between 
domestic enterprises and those with foreign ownership. This simple specification allows us to 
compare productivities and factor intensities of domestic firms and those with foreign capital. 
Our results presented in Table 3 show that companies with foreign direct investment (FDI) are 
significantly more productive than domestic firms. The size of the coefficient on FDI dummy is 
the largest in Russia and the smallest in Poland. In Russia, companies with foreign participation 
enjoy an efficiency premium of about 70 percent, while in Poland this premium is just 9 percent 
                                                 
9 Assuming that foreign participation in these countries grows over time, we probably count some companies, in 
which foreigners acquired stakes during our sample period, as partly or wholly foreign owned throughout. We may, 
therefore, overstate the foreign presence in the earlier years and, consequently, dilute the technological and 
managerial superiority of companies with foreign ownership over domestic firms. We think, however, that the 
resulting downward bias on the spillover effect is relatively small, since companies tend to change ownership only 
infrequently. 
10  We experimented with the inclusion of these industries and found that this does not change our qualitative results.   8
(in fact, the coefficient on FDI is not statistically significant in the case of Poland). These are 
very large productivity differences. 
A simple comparison of average labor productivities in Russia and Poland suggests that the 
observed variation in the efficiency premium is due in a large part to differences in productivity 
of domestic firms. While both domestic firms and firms with FDI are more productive in Poland 
than in Russia, domestic firms are 2.2 times more productive and firms with foreign ownership 
are only about 1.7 times more productive. Interestingly, a comparison between Russia and 
Romania suggests a rather different story. Both, domestic firms and firms with FDI, are more 
productive in Russia, than in Romania, but domestic firms are just 1.7 times more productive, 
while firms with foreign ownership are 2.9 times more productive. In this latter case, therefore, 
the variation in the efficiency premium is due largely to differences in productivity of firms with 
FDI.  
Companies with FDI are also somewhat less labor intensive and somewhat more capital 
intensive. The differences are particularly striking in Russia, where companies with FDI have 
labor intensity that is 42 percentage points lower and capital intensity that is 27 percentage points 
higher than those of domestic firms. For comparison, in Poland and Romania the difference in 
labor intensity does not exceed 7 percentage points and the difference in capital intensity is 
between 4 and 5 percentage points. In both Russia and Ukraine domestic companies are 
extremely labor intensive, with labor elasticities exceeding 1, which distinguishes them sharply 
from firms in Poland and Romania. While this may reflect issues with capital valuation, it could 
also point to severe problems of depreciation and obsoleteness of the capital stock in these 
countries. Labor hoarding or the wide-spread use of part-time workers in Russia and Ukraine 
may be an additional explanation of this phenomenon. 
In order to study the potential spillover effects of firms with foreign participation on 












FDI in the formula stands for the share of foreign ownership that ranges from 0.1 to 1, while L 
denotes the number of employees. FDI DENSITY measures the weighted labor employed in 
firms with foreign capital, relative to the total labor employed in a given year, sector, and region.   9
This is a measure of foreign presence that is standard in this literature. It allows us to study 
horizontal spillovers, i.e. those to enterprises within the same industry. Since we use two-digit 
industries to define sectors, this measure also captures some vertical spillovers, i.e. those to 
enterprises in upstream industries. In addition, it reflects the likely local nature of spillovers in 
countries with yet not fully developed business communication networks. 
On average, density of firms with FDI is just over 20 percent in Poland and Romania, while 
it is not even 10 percent in Russia and Ukraine. It is possible that the effects of FDI on domestic 
firms change as FDI accumulate. As more foreign capital flows in, foreign firms may become 
more inclined to introduce more advanced technologies. This may happen for a number of 
reasons. Foreign firms may become more familiar with local conditions, and, therefore, more 
confident in bringing in more advanced technologies. Competition among foreign firms 
themselves may create additional incentives to use the most recent technologies. They may also 
become more familiar with local producers and trust them with production of more sophisticated 
components. If this is the case, one would expect to see more positive spillovers in Poland and 
Romania, than in Russia and Ukraine. 
Table 4 provides a breakdown of FDI DENSITY by industrial sector for each country. 
Interestingly, there is quite a significant difference between industrial composition of FDI in 
Russia and Ukraine on the one hand, and Poland and Romania on the other. Among 
manufacturing sectors, there is strong correlation (about .30) in FDI DENSITY between Poland 
and Romania, and even stronger correlation (about 0.86) between Russia and Ukraine. However, 
across these two groups of countries correlations are much smaller: FDI DENSITY by sector in 
Poland or Romania is correlated with that in Russia with the coefficient of 0.02-0.03 and with 
that in Ukraine with the coefficient of 0.13-0.17. 
High correlations in FDI DENSITY by sector within our two country groups suggest that 
foreign capital tends to favor or avoid roughly the same industries in countries different in many 
respects, yet united by their belonging to transition economies of either Eastern Europe or the 
NIS. Low correlations between the two groups, however, point to differences in attractiveness of 
various manufacturing sectors for foreign investment in Eastern Europe versus the NIS. Eastern 
European countries attract FDI into relatively more capital intensive and high-tech sectors: 
communication equipment, electrical equipment, and production of motor vehicles seem to 
attract a lot of FDI in both Poland and Romania. In contrast, in the NIS FDI go into natural   10
resource processing industries, such as basic metals or paper, rather than into technologically 
intensive production of communication equipment. It is interesting to notice also that foreign 
presence in production of tobacco is high in all four countries, and in Russia, Romania and 
Poland there is a large share of foreign employment in the wood industry. In contrast to Poland, 
where foreign share is relatively big in some of the machine building sectors and furniture, in 
Romania foreign companies are common in the light industry, i.e. textile, apparel, and leather.   
Such composition of investments may reflect comparative advantage, but can also be a result 
of institutional differences.  During the period under consideration, both Poland and Romania 
were EU accession countries, while EU accession of Russia and Ukraine is not on the agenda. 
Therefore, foreign investors may consider Poland and Romania as a cheap labor export platform 
to the EU, while due to poor institutional quality and higher barriers to trade with the EU Russia 
and Ukraine can only be considered as natural resource suppliers for the European market. Being 
relatively big countries, Russia and Ukraine can also attract FDI aimed at supplying the domestic 
market. Investments into car assembly in these two countries can fall into this category, while 
similar investments in Poland can aim at supplying not only Polish, but also the EU market. 
According to Moran (2005), who argues that export-oriented foreign entrants bring with them 
better technologies and therefore are more likely to generate positive spillovers, one would 
expect to see more positive spillovers in Poland and Romania, than in Russia and Ukraine.  
We proceed to search for the potential spillovers to domestic companies using the following 
general specification (estimated for domestic firms only): 
,, , , , , ln ln ln it L it K it tsr it VA L K FDI DENSITY α ββ γ ε =+ + + + . 
We estimate this equation, first, using the data averaged by year, sector, and region, second, 
controlling for year and firm fixed effects and, third, allowing for some heterogeneity in the 
production function. The first approach gives a sense of how the presence of fully and partially 
foreign-owned firms is associated with local sectoral productivity. The second approach takes 
into account firm heterogeneity and, therefore, alleviates potential biases that could result from 
ignoring it. Finally, the third approach allows differences in the production function by sector, as 
well as depending on the degree of local foreign presence in the sector, in addition to firm fixed 
effects. The three estimations are reported, respectively, in Panels A, B, and C of Table 5.   11
In the first specification (Panel A) for Russia and Ukraine, the coefficient on FDI DENSITY  
is positive and statistically significant, while for Poland and Romania, this coefficient is negative 
and statistically significant for Romania, although not for Poland. These results suggest that 
foreign capital in Russia and Ukraine tends to flow to sectors and regions where domestic firms 
are more productive. However, in Poland and Romania firms with foreign participation tend to 
concentrate in relatively unproductive sectors and regions. 
In the second specification with firm fixed effects (Panel B) the coefficient on FDI 
DENSITY is positive but statistically insignificant for all the countries, except Russia, where it is 
negative and insignificant. This result suggests that, generally, there is no evidence for spillover 
effects from foreign direct investment on productivity of domestic firms. This finding is in 
agreement with most of the recent empirical literature on FDI spillovers. 
In the case of Poland, however, the positive spillover effect is borderline significant at 12% 
level, which may be due to simultaneity that affects both domestic firms and firms with foreign 
capital, above and beyond firm-specific fixed effects. To control for this possibility, we 
constructed an instrumental variable for FDI DENSITY equal to the average FDI DENSITY in 
the same sector across similar neighboring countries. As we noted above, there is a fairly strong 
correlation of FDI DENSITY by sector across countries of Eastern Europe. Yet, average FDI 
DENSITY of other countries is likely exogenous with respect to performance of domestic firms, 
which makes it a suitable instrument. We used data from Amadeus on Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, all relatively small economies and therefore 
unlikely to influence firm performance elsewhere. Our results (see Table 6) demonstrate that 
controlling for potential simultaneity makes the coefficient on FDI DENSITY completely 
statistically insignificant and, in fact, negative. 
As we already mentioned, the recent literature started to pay more attention to heterogeneity 
of FDI and, in particular, to potential differences in spillovers on domestic firms from export-
oriented FDI and FDI aimed at supplying domestic markets (Moran (2005), Melitz (2005)). We 
tested this hypothesis for Russia, the only country for which we have the necessary data. Using a 
dataset on international trade transactions, we identified those foreign firms that exported more 
than 50 percent of their output. We computed a measure of EXPORT-ORIENTED FDI 
DENSITY as a share of such firms in the total employment in each year, sector, and region, 
weighted by the size of the foreign stake. The coefficient on EXPORT-ORIENTED FDI   12
DENSITY turned out to be positive and significant in the fixed effects specification (see Table 
7), while that on FDI DENSITY became negative and statistically insignificant. This result 
supports the idea that the positive spillover effect on productivity originates from export-oriented 
FDI, if at all. 
In the third specification (Panel C) we allow production functions to be different across 
sectors and to be influenced by FDI DENSITY. After all, it is reasonable to expect that if foreign 
presence has any effect on domestic firms, it is unlikely to be limited to productivity. Rather, 
technological spillovers should affect the production function of domestic firms, in particular, the 
factor intensities. If domestic firms become more technologically sophisticated as a result of their 
contact with foreigners, their production processes are likely to become more capital intensive 
and less labor intensive. This is, indeed, the case in Poland. In this country,  in sectors with 10 
percent local foreign ownership capital intensity of domestic firms is over 2 percentage points 
higher and labor intensity is over 3.5 percentage points lower than elsewhere. In Romania the 
difference in intensities is not statistically significant, but domestic firms appear somewhat less 
labor intensive where the density of foreign firms is higher. For Ukraine we do not have data on 
capital, but labor intensity of domestic firms also appears to be smaller in sectors and regions 
with substantial foreign presence, although the difference is not significant. Surprisingly, the 
results for Russia are absolutely different: domestic firms are more labor-intensive and less 
capital intensive in sectors that attract a lot of FDI.
11  
Our findings on the production function effects in Russia and Poland may reflect backward 
linkages between domestic and foreign firms. There is anecdotal evidence suggesting that if 
foreign firms work with Russian suppliers, then these suppliers are producers of technologically 
simple and often labor intensive goods. Ford, for example, assembles cars in Russia using 
imported components, with the exception of a few components made of rubber. Poland, on the 
other hand, has a longer history of FDI inflows, giving domestic producers of the same goods 
time to upgrade their technologies to more capital-intensive processes. Additionally, foreign 
investors in Poland may have become more familiar with local producers and may, therefore, 
trust them with production of some capital-intensive components. An alternative and 
complementary explanation of our findings is that competition from foreign firms forces 
                                                 
11 We cannot, at this stage, fully exclude the possibility of reverse causality, i.e. that foreign companies are attracted 
to more capital intensive and less labor intensive parts of the domestic economy in Poland, and to less capital 
intensive and more labor intensive parts of the domestic economy in Russia. We return to this issue below.   13
domestic firms to adjust in ways that depend on the situation in their particular country. Thus, 
while Polish firms upgrade their capital and technologies in order to compete in the same market 
with foreign entrants, Russian firms shield themselves from foreign competition by concentrating 
on producing unsophisticated labor-intensive goods for the less well-off segments of the 
population. 
To summarize, we find that firms with foreign capital are significantly more productive than 
domestic companies in all four countries. However, we find no evidence for productivity 
spillovers (whether positive or negative) in all the countries, however different they are. The only 
exception to this finding is export-oriented FDI, which generate positive spillover effects on 
productivity of domestic firms in Russia. Our results suggest that spillover effects may manifest 
themselves in changes in the production functions of domestic firms, rather than simply in the 
higher TFP. Domestic firms in Poland are more capital-intensive and less labor-intensive where 
FDI are more abundant, while the reverse is true in Russia. In other words, we observe more 
beneficial effects in a country that has a larger foreign presence and that is more open to foreign 
trade, which is consistent with our expectations.  
 
The Role of Education and Institutions 
 
External factors, such as the endowment of skills, measured by the education level in the host 
country, and the quality of the host country’s institutions, can influence both the choice of 
technologies used by foreign investors and the capacity and incentives of domestic firms to learn 
from their foreign competitors. In this section we look at the effects of education and corruption 
on productivity of foreign firms and on the spillovers that they impart on domestic firms. 
Formally, the education level in all the countries that we consider is quite high: for example, 
in Russia, according to the latest population census, about 77% of the population has at least 
secondary education; in the Ukraine, Poland, and Romania the proportion is comparably high.
12 
However, educational achievement of the local population differs substantially from region to 
                                                 
12 There are several reasons why this formal measure of educational achievement may overestimate the true level of 
education and skills. First of all, a number of studies have demonstrated that students from transition countries, such 
as Russia, often have problems with practical implementation of their knowledge to non-standard tasks. Secondly, 
there is anecdotal evidence that the quality of education has declined after the beginning of transition, at least in 
Russia. Unfortunately, there are no measures of quality, rather than just “quantity” of education.   14
region within a country.
 13 We use this regional variation to study how local educational levels 
influence the domestic impact of foreign firms. We divided all regions within a country into 
three equally-sized groups: those with low, average, and high share of the population with at 
least secondary education. We then estimated the key specifications of the previous section for 
two sub-groups of firms: those located in the low-education regions and in the high-education 
regions.
14 
We begin by considering the direct effect of foreign presence. Differences in education may 
influence both the decision of foreign firms to locate in a certain region and their choice of 
technologies. In Table 8 we report estimations of the same model that we used in Table 3 
separately for firms in the low-education regions and those in the high-education regions. The 
results show that in Russia the difference between the firms located in different regions is not 
very significant, although the productivity gap between domestic and foreign firms is somewhat 
larger in the less educated regions. Therefore, differences in education either have no influence 
on the behavior of foreign direct investors, or influence only their location decision in this 
country. In Ukraine, productivity differences between foreign and domestic firms are more 
pronounced in the regions with better educated labor force. This finding suggests that in Ukraine 
foreign firms have advantages in those regions, where they have access to the labor pool of a 
better quality. In Poland, firms with foreign participation are dramatically more productive than 
domestic firms in the less educated regions, while they are on the par with domestic firms in the 
more educated ones. At the same time, foreign firms in the less educated areas operate using the 
same production function as domestic firms, while those in the more educated areas are 
substantially more capital intensive than domestic firms. A possible explanation is that while 
both domestic and foreign firms produce similar goods in the less educated areas, in the more 
educated areas domestic firms produce less technologically advanced goods than their foreign 
counterparts, but are just as productive in what they do. In Romania, the overall difference in 
productivity between domestic and foreign firms is almost the same irrespective of the 
educational level of the area, while the production function differences are more pronounced in 
the less educated regions. This would be consistent with a situation, in which domestic firms in 
                                                 
13 Information about educational levels was obtained from the Population Census of respective countries. 
14 The relative share of foreign firms in the low-education and the high-education regions was similar.   15
the poorly educated parts of the country produce very low technology goods, while those in the 
more educated regions are more similar to foreign firms in the nature of their production. 
Several studies (Blalock and Gertler, 2003, Yudaeva et al , 2003) suggest that ability of 
domestic firms to absorb knowledge spillovers may depend on the educational level of the 
population. We proceed by using cross-regional differences to test the hypothesis of the 
importance of education for spillovers. We estimated our spillover model separately for firms in 
the low-education regions and those in the high-education regions. In this specification we 
allowed factor intensities to vary by industry and to depend on the density of foreign companies 
in the same sector and region. The results (Table 9) show no evidence for productivity spillovers 
irrespective of the educational level of the local population, with the exception of Ukraine where 
we observe positive spillovers only in high-education regions. There is, however, some evidence 
that the effect of foreign presence on the production function of domestic firms in Poland and 
Russia  differs depending on the educational attainment. In the less educated areas of both 
countries production functions of domestic firms do not depend on FDI density in the same 
region and industry. Differences, reported earlier, are concentrated in highly educated regions.   
In the more educated areas of Poland domestic firms are less labor intensive and more capital 
intensive where the density of foreign firms is higher. (We observe a similar effect in the case of 
Ukraine, but given the absence of data on capital, this finding should be treated with caution.) In 
Russia the situation is exactly the opposite: domestic firms in the more educated areas are more 
labor intensive and less capital intensive where the density of foreign firms is higher. These 
results suggest that education, which can be regarded as a proxy for absorptive capacity, is the 
major pre-condition for spillover effects on productivity or on production functions. 
The study by Yudaeva et al. (2003) demonstrated that in Russia in the early years of 
transition, policies of regional authorities had a significant influence on the productivity of 
foreign firms. It is interesting to check whether this effect is still present in the more recent 
period. Unfortunately, the measures of government reform orientation that were used in Yudaeva 
et al. (2003) are not available for recent years or for other countries. Instead, we use a measure of 
the perception of corruption, which has recently been reported by INDEM, a Russian anti-
corruption think tank. This measure is available for 40 Russian regions, and is constructed using 
the results of a survey of households and businesses in these regions. As in the case of education, 
we test for the effect of corruption by estimating our regression equations in the sub-samples of   16
regions with high and with low levels of corruption. As a corruption index we used integrated 
index of corruption, reported at http://www.indem.ru.   
Consistently with the findings of Yudaeva et al. (2003), foreign firms are more productive 
than domestic ones in the regions with low corruption (Table 10). In the high-corruption regions 
there are no differences in productivity between domestic and foreign firms. This result seems to 
contradict our earlier finding that productivity gap in Russia is higher than in Poland, which is 
less corrupt. However, at the country level this difference may be due to other factors. Poland is 
not only less corrupt than Russia, but also more open, has more FDI, and is generally more 
advanced.    
We also tested for the presence of knowledge spillovers in high and low corruption regions 
(Table 11). FDI DENSITY is insignificant in high-corruption region, and negative and 
significant in low-corruption regions. As shown in Table 10, foreign firms in the regions with 
low corruption are more than twice as productive as domestic firms. Such a large productivity 
difference could result in crowding out of local domestic firms. The overall effect on welfare can 
still be positive, because foreign-owned firms are so much more productive than domestic ones.  
There also seems to be a difference between low and high corruption regions in the effect of FDI 
DENSITY on the production function of domestic firms. The coefficient on the cross term 
between the log of labor and FDI DENSITY is positive and significant only in low corruption 
regions, while in high corruption regions this coefficient is positive, but insignificant. Therefore, 
domestic firms react to foreign entry by switching to more labor-intensive technologies only if 
the corruption level is low. This may be an adjustment that Russian firms make in order to 
compete with highly productive foreign-owned firms. By switching to more labor-intensive 
technologies and producing goods of low quality but at cheaper costs, domestic firms find their 
niche as producers for less well-off consumers. Additionally, some domestic firms may become 
suppliers for foreign-owned firms, and, as we argued before, labor-intensive firms can have 
higher chances to be accepted by foreign firms as their suppliers. The lack of any effects in the 
high-corruption regions is consistent with the following interpretation. Domestic firms in these 
regions use their connections with the local authorities to put administrative pressure on foreign-
owned firms, which reduces their effectiveness. This practice reduces the competitive pressure 
from foreign-owned firms, which, in turn, reduces the incentives of domestic firms to adopt new 
technologies.   17
To summarize, we show that the effects of education on the characteristics of foreign 
investors do not follow any single pattern across the four countries that we study. Only in 
Ukraine productivity spillovers from FDI depend positively on education. Results for Russia and 
Poland suggest that education may play a role in facilitating the effect of foreign presence on the 
production function of domestic firms. Institutional environment, measured by the corruption 
level, has a more complicated effect on foreign and domestic firms. Productivity of foreign firms 
located in more corrupt environments is not significantly different from productivity of domestic 
firms. However, foreign firms located in relatively low-corruption regions are much more 
productive than domestic firms. As a result, productivity spillovers on domestic firms are 
negative, and domestic firms have to change their production function to allow them to compete 
better or to work as suppliers for foreign firms. Both, the production function and the 




We now go beyond the static specification to analyze whether and how foreign presence 
affects the change in, rather than merely the level of, productivity of domestic firms. The 
dynamic panel estimation that we use allows us to control for potential endogeneity of FDI 
DENSITY by instrumenting it using past values. The dynamic specification also allows us to 
include, in addition to the density of foreign firms, a measure of their productivity. Our results 
for Russia reported above (see Table 7) suggest that export-oriented foreign firms generate 
stronger spillovers, presumably because they use more advanced technologies in order to 
compete in the international market. This finding raises a more general question: do more 
productive foreign companies exert a stronger spillover effect on domestic firms? This is a 
natural question to ask, yet it has not received much attention in the existing literature. 
We measure total factor productivity (TFP) of individual firms as a residual from a fixed 
effects estimation of the Cobb-Douglas production function, with factor shares that are allowed 
to vary by industrial sector.
 15 We then aggregate our measure to obtain average TFP of firms 
                                                 
15 We experimented with an alternative measure of TFP based on stochastic frontier estimation, again with factor 
shares that vary by sector. Effectively, the stochastic frontier approach allows for firm fixed effects with industry-
specific estimated growth trends. However, we encountered convergence problems when running these estimations   18
with foreign ownership in each sector and region in a given year (FDI TFP). We study dynamic 
effects of FDI TFP and FDI DENSITY using the following specification: 
,1 , , , , , , it it tsr tsr it TFP TFP FDI TFP FDI DENSITY α βγ ε + =+ + +  
We estimate this equation only for domestic companies using the system GMM method of 
Blundell and Bond (1998). This method estimates a system of equations in levels and first 
differences using as instruments, respectively, lagged first differences and lagged levels of 
endogenous variables (as well as lags and leads of exogenous variables). In a model with a 
lagged dependent variable this approach is superior to ordinary least squares, which causes an 
upward bias, and to the fixed effects estimator, which produces a downward bias in the 
coefficient α. This method also tends to perform better than the difference GMM approach of 
Arellano and Bond (1991), which is based on equations in first differences only, especially in the 
case of persistent series when lagged levels provide weak instruments for subsequent first 
differences. 
Table 12 displays our results. We observe from Panel A that productivity of foreign firms is 
indeed positively associated with productivity of domestic firms in the same sector and region in 
the following year. The coefficient on FDI TFP is positive for all four countries and statistically 
significant for Russia and Romania. In other words, productivity of domestic firms tends to grow  
where firms with FDI are more productive. This finding is in contrast with the effect of merely 
foreign presence: the coefficient on FDI DENSITY is negative in three out of four countries and 
statistically significant in Romania. Thus, it appears that foreign entry slows productivity growth 
of domestic firms, possibly because they lose market share yielding to increased competition. 
We argued above that effects of foreign presence may change as foreign capital accumulates. 
Namely, foreign firms may initially focus on labor-intensive activities in order to benefit from 
low labor costs in the host countries, but shift to more advanced technologies as their weight and 
experience in the area grows. They may also be unwilling initially to outsource high-technology 
jobs to local producers, but as they invest more in their relationship with domestic firms, they 
may trust the locals with production of more sophisticated components. We incorporate this 
potential threshold effect into our analysis by adding a variable that equals FDI DENSITY if the 
latter exceeds 50 percent, and zero otherwise. Our results reported in Panel B show that the 
                                                                                                                                                             
on Russian and Ukrainian data. For Poland and Romania, the two measures were very highly correlated, suggesting 
that the fixed effects approach is sufficiently accurate.   19
coefficients on FDI DENSITY and FDI DENSITY over 50% are of different signs in three out of 
four countries. Both are statistically significant in Romania, where the productivity-reducing 
effect of foreign presence in much smaller in sectors and regions where foreign firms dominate  
(-0.366 as compared to -1.052). This is consistent with our notion of threshold effect, although 
the spillover effect in FDI-abundant sectors and regions is still negative. It is possible that it 
takes not only large foreign presence, but also a longer period to see any positive spillover effect, 
but, unfortunately, our panel is too short to tell. Interestingly, the signs on FDI DENSITY and 
FDI DENSITY over 50% are reversed in Russia, although both are statistically insignificant. 
Our results above (see Table 5, Panel C) suggest that the effect of foreign entry may manifest 
itself in the change of the production function of domestic firms, rather than simply in higher 
total factor productivity. To examine this issue in a dynamic setting, we look at the effects that 
foreign presence and foreign productivity have on the capital-labor ratio of domestic firms:  




KK Log Log FDI TFP FDI DENSITY LL α βγ ε
+
=++ +  
The outcome of our estimations is reported in Table 13. For Poland and Romania, Panel A 
shows that higher productivity of foreign companies is associated with higher capital-labor ratios 
of domestic firms in the same sector and region in the following year. This is consistent with the 
idea that more productive foreign firms generate more pronounced positive effects on domestic 
firms. Higher density of foreign companies, however, is associated with lower capital-labor 
ratios in the following year in both countries. This is consistent with the notion that foreign entry, 
rather than driving technology transfer, forces domestic firms to compete by focusing on cheaper 
low-technology goods for the less well-off segments of the domestic population. This finding 
does not necessarily contradict the results we obtained above using a static specification (see 
Table 5, Panel C). Since in the dynamic regressions we control for the productivity of foreign 
firms, our measure of their density is largely divorced from their efficiency. While highly 
efficient foreign entrants are a possible source of knowledge spillovers, the sheer number of 
foreign firms affects domestic producers most likely through increased competition. An 
alternative explanation would suggest that our static results reflect reverse causation. In other 
words, foreign companies in Poland and Romania are attracted to more capital-intensive 
segments of these economies, but once they establish there, they drive domestic firms into more 
labor-intensive activities. In Russia, neither FDI TFP, nor FDI DENSITY is significantly   20
associated with the change in productivity of domestic firms. Ukraine is excluded from these 
estimations due to the lack of data on capital. 
It is possible that the effect of foreign presence on the capital-labor ratios of domestic firms is 
also subject to threshold effects. To test this proposition we again included FDI DENSITY over 
50% in the regressions (Panel B). In the case of Poland and Romania, the negative effect appears 
weaker for those firms located in sectors and regions where companies with foreign ownership 
dominate (-0.515 versus -1.638 in Romania). This finding supports our threshold hypothesis: as 
the weight of FDI increases, foreign firms bring in more advanced technologies and/or outsource 
the production of more capital-intensive parts to local firms. In Russia, however, the negative 
effect seems to be driven by the more FDI-abundant sectors and regions. This may be related to 
our earlier finding (see Table 5, Panel C) that in Russia, unlike Poland or Romania, greater 
presence of foreign capital is associated with higher labor intensity and lower capital intensity of 
domestic firms. It appears that in this country foreign firms are attracted to more labor-intensive 
parts of the economy and, when and where they become dominant, they cause domestic firms to 
become even more labor-intensive. This result may reflect the adjustment strategy of local firms 
that focus on serving the less well-off segments of the population, instead of competing directly 
with the far more productive foreign firms. A contributing factor may be that Russian firms 
benefit less from outsourcing, than do firms in Poland and Romania. We suspect that foreign 
firms in Russia outsource much less to local producers and, if outsourcing does take place, only 
relatively simple and more labor-intensive products are outsourced. While in Poland and 
Romania many of the domestic firms, remaining in the sectors and regions dominated by 
foreigners, work as their suppliers, in Russia, the remaining domestic firms end up shifting their 
production to less sophisticated and more labor-intensive goods. 
To study the role of education and institutions on the spillover effect in the dynamic setting, 
we ran the estimations from Table 12 and Table 13 separately for low-education and high-
education regions, as well as for high-corruption and low-corruption regions in Russia. We 
obtained few clear-cut results, except in the case of Romania.
16 For that country, our findings are 
reported in Tables 14 and 15. It turns out that the negative effect of FDI DENSITY is statistically 
significant only in the low-education regions, while the positive effect of FDI TFP is statistically 
                                                 
16 For the other countries the results were either very similar for both sub-samples (Russia and Ukraine) or 
statistically insignificant (Poland). In addition, a number of these estimations failed the Hansen test for 
overidentification, which put into question the reliability of these particular findings.   21
significant only in the high-education regions. These observations hold for both, the productivity 
and the capital-labor ratio of domestic firms, and support the view that absorptive capacity, as 
proxied by education, is clearly important for reaping benefits from FDI.  
To summarize, we find strong evidence showing that productivity of foreign firms matters: 
productivity and capital intensity of domestic firms in the following year are higher where 
foreign firms are more productive, holding their density constant. This beneficial effect on 
domestic producers is concentrated in regions with more educated populations, as the Romanian 
case demonstrates. In contrast, productivity and capital intensity of domestic firms in the 
following year tend to be lower where foreign firms are more abundant, likely due to increased 
competition. This detrimental effect is concentrated in low-education regions in Romania, 
underscoring the importance of absorptive capacity of domestic producers. There is also some 
evidence of threshold effects: in some countries (Romania) the negative impact of foreign 
presence is much smaller in sectors and regions where foreign companies dominate, while in 
other countries (Russia) this negative impact tends to be concentrated exactly where foreign 




The literature on FDI and their effects on domestic firms usually concentrates on productivity 
differences between FDI and domestic firms and on productivity spillovers from FDI to domestic 
firms. At the same time, theoretical considerations used to justify empirical analyses usually state 
that FDI should possess different technologies and that their entry should stimulate technological 
upgrade by domestic firms. Therefore, the theory may be reinterpreted as suggesting that FDI 
have different production functions than domestic firms and that FDI entry stimulates production 
function change by domestic firms. In addition, more productive foreign firms with superior 
technologies should have a larger impact on both, the productivity and the production function, 
of domestic firms. 
This paper looks at the evidence from four transition countries – Russia, Ukraine, Poland, 
and Romania, – and demonstrates that this new interpretation of the theory is confirmed by the 
data. In the more developed countries with better institutions and larger FDI inflows (Poland and 
Romania), foreign presence is associated with higher capital intensity and lower labor intensity   22
of domestic firms. Even though foreign entry causes capital-labor ratios to decline initially, 
further accumulation of foreign capital tends to stimulate production function change by 
domestic firms toward more capital intensive functions. This threshold effect may reflect better 
technologies brought in by foreign firms once they become established in the host country, as 
well as their increased willingness to outsource more sophisticated parts to local producers. 
Absorptive capacity of domestic firms is also important: the evidence of the production function 
change toward more capital-intensive technologies is strongest in areas where the labor force is 
more educated. 
In contrast, in the countries with worse institutions and correspondingly smaller FDI inflows 
(Russia
17), foreign presence is associated with lower capital intensity and higher labor intensity 
of domestic firms. The shift to more labor-intensive technologies happens primarily where 
foreign capital is more abundant. Domestic firms may choose this adaptation in order to secure a 
separate market for themselves by specializing in serving relatively poor segments of the 
population. This effect may also reflect reluctance of foreign firms to outsource anything but the 
production of simple labor-intensive components to domestic suppliers. The reason for such 
reluctance may be the lack of confidence in the quality of domestically-produced goods and the 
ability of local firms to deliver their products on time. The production function effect is observed 
only in the relatively more educated and the less corrupt regions. In highly corrupt regions, 
foreign firms do not exhibit any productivity advantage over domestic firms, possibly as a result 
of the attitude of local authorities, which in turn is lobbied for by domestic producers. 
  As far as conventional productivity spillovers are concerned, we failed to find evidence 
of their presence, except in a few special cases. In Romania, foreign presence leads to lower 
productivity of domestic firms after one year, but this effect is present only in low-education 
regions and appears to wear out as more foreign capital is accumulated. In Ukraine, foreign 
presence is associated contemporaneously with higher output of domestic firms in high-
education regions. In Russia, negative spillovers occur in the less corrupt regions, where foreign 
firms are more than twice as productive as domestic firms. Also, importantly, export-oriented 
foreign firms in Russia generate positive spillovers on domestic firms. Since such foreign firms 
bring cutting-edge technologies to host countries, the scope for knowledge spillovers is higher 
for those domestic firms that compete with or work as suppliers for export-oriented foreigners. 
                                                 
17 The absence of data on capital in the Ukraine makes the analysis of production functions there problematic.   23
More generally, own productivity of foreign firms matters: domestic companies show higher 
next-year productivity, as well as larger next-year capital-labor ratios, where foreign entrants are 
more productive.  
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Russia Ukraine Poland Romania
8,230 4,870 10,560 6,560
13.7 5.2 0.7 15.3
8.3 9.1 19.9 7.5
Domestic credit to the private sector, % GDP, 2002 17.7 18.0 28.8 8.4
10.4 0.3 3.1 0.9
-0.40 -0.74 0.61 -0.33
-0.78 -0.79 0.65 -0.12
Cost of starting a business, number of procedures, 2004 9 15 10 5
Cost of enforcing contracts, number of procedures, 2004 29 28 41 43
0 3 31 17 8
20 80 30 50
83 96 101 82


































Sources: International Financial Statistics, World Development Indicators, World Bank Governance Database,


























1998 10,405 0.59 - - - - - -
1999 20,190 2.99 - - 4,494 18.36 8,794 23.72
2000 12,330 1.80 11,960 2.20 4,807 18.22 9,639 25.36
2001 20,752 3.53 11,408 2.20 5,422 18.54 10,544 26.55
2002 17,923 4.20 10,743 2.40 4,789 19.15 10,989 26.94
2003 - - 10,315 2.50 572 23.60 11,311 26.13
Total 81,600 2.91 44,426 2.30 20,084 18.71 51,277 25.83
Sources: National Statistical Authorities (Russia and Ukraine), Amadeus Database (Poland and Romania)
Table 1. Selected Economic Indicators
Selected macroeconomic indicators:
Selected financial indicators:
Unemployment rate, %, 2003
CPI inflation, % p.a., 2003
GDP per capita, PPP USD, 2002
Rule of law, index, 2002
Stocks traded, total value, % GDP, 2002
Secondary school enrollment, %, 2000
Difficulty firing, index, 2004
Difficulty hiring, index, 2004
Selected labor market indicators:
Selected openness indicators:
Tertiary school enrollment, %, 2000
Government effectiveness, index, 2002
Selected institutional indicators:
Restrictions on imports, 2004
Table 2. Summary of Company Level Data
Restrictions on exports, 2004
Restrictions on foreign direct investment, 2004
Russia Ukraine Poland Romania
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Russia Ukraine Poland Romania
1.114*** 1.143*** 0.507*** 0.672***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.016] [0.007]
-0.420*** 0.035 -0.020 -0.073***
[0.024] [0.029] [0.027] [0.012]
0.052*** - 0.298*** 0.282***
[0.003] [0.010] [0.004]
0.273*** - 0.041** 0.047***
[0.016] [0.018] [0.007]
0.532*** 0.210 0.089 0.328***
[0.097] [0.170] [0.132] [0.039]
yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yes
62305 38558 9435 47114
0.742 0.625 0.646 0.765
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR NACE1.1 Russia Ukraine Poland Romania
Foods and beverages 15 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.17
Tobacco products 16 0.29 0.34 0.22 0.22
Textiles 17 0.03 0.03 0.15 0.33
Apparel 18 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.28
Leather 19 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.42
Wood products 20 0.05 0.07 0.25 0.25
Paper 21 0.13 0.11 0.33 0.27
Publishing 22 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.17
Chemicals 24 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.19
Rubber and plastics 25 0.06 0.05 0.31 0.21
Other non-metals 26 0.06 0.04 0.19 0.13
Basic metals 27 0.11 0.10 0.18 0.31
Metal products 28 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.08
Machinery 29 0.03 0.04 0.12 0.19
Office equipment 30 0.10 0.00 0.08 0.11
Electrical equipment 31 0.05 0.04 0.42 0.23
Communication equipment 32 0.00 0.06 0.45 0.41
Precision instruments 33 0.04 0.04 0.17 0.12
Motor vehicles 34 0.04 0.13 0.41 0.26
Other transport equipment 35 0.03 0.06 0.15 0.17
Furniture 36 0.04 0.02 0.42 0.12
Recycling 37 0.09 0.07 0.16 0.20
Total 0.06 0.07 0.21 0.22
Dependent variable: Log Value Added
Table 3. Direct Effect of Foreign Participation
Log Fixed Capital X FDI
Log Fixed Capital








Table 4. FDI DENSITY by Industrial Sector
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%;  robust standard errors in brackets
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Russia Ukraine Poland Romania
0.932*** 1.018*** 0.318*** 0.624***
[0.019] [0.035] [0.025] [0.020]
0.191*** - 0.335*** 0.325***
[0.013] [0.017] [0.014]
0.779*** 0.960*** -0.073 -0.124***
[0.196] [0.352] [0.062] [0.046]
5995 2163 1320 3755
0.722 0.357 0.636 0.764
Russia Ukraine Poland Romania
0.784*** 0.945*** 0.392*** 0.604***
[0.017] [0.018] [0.063] [0.015]
0.009 - 0.191*** 0.196***
[0.010] [0.055] [0.007]
-0.027 0.068 0.148 0.023
[0.094] [0.273] [0.096] [0.055]
yes yes yes yes
20289 13548 3300 8497
60429 37628 7483 35252
0.148 0.320 0.126 0.550
Russia Ukraine Poland Romania
0.201** -0.142 -0.356** -0.052
[0.099] [0.303] [0.143] [0.056]
-0.163** - 0.213* 0.008
[0.067] [0.110] [0.029]
yes yes yes yes
20289 13490 3300 8497
60429 37424 7483 35252
0.153 0.327 0.170 0.556
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; robust st. errors in brackets; p-values in parentheses
Log Employment
Log Fixed Capital
Dependent variable: Log Value Added
Panel A: OLS on year, sector, region means
Dependent variable: Log Value Added
Table 5. Static Specification with FDI DENSITY
N
FDI DENSITY
Panel B: Panel estimation with firm fixed effects
R2







Year and Firm Fixed Effects
Panel C: Panel estimation with heterogeneous production functions
yes
Log Fixed Capital X FDI DENSITY
Log Employment X Sector








-y e s Log Fixed Capital X Sector
FDI DENSITY X Sector
N groups
N observations
Year and Firm Fixed Effects
 






































Year and Firm Fixed Effects
Table 6. IV Estimation for Poland
Table 7. Role of exporting FDI in Russia
Dependent variable: Log Value Added
Dependent variable: Log Value Added
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Russia Ukraine Poland Romania
1.135*** 1.221*** 0.476*** 0.652***
[0.011] [0.012] [0.027] [0.010]
-0.504*** 0.008 -0.005 -0.099***
[0.061] [0.065] [0.053] [0.018]
0.039*** - 0.322*** 0.284***
[0.006] [0.017] [0.007]
0.292*** - -0.004 0.071***
[0.044] [0.034] [0.012]
0.857*** 0.301 0.505** 0.352***
[0.260] [0.389] [0.223] [0.063]
yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yes
19642 13705 3115 17298
0.762 0.608 0.635 0.752
Russia Ukraine Poland Romania
1.086*** 1.032*** 0.535*** 0.661***
[0.011] [0.012] [0.026] [0.012]
-0.387*** -0.018 -0.053 -0.048**
[0.048] [0.051] [0.037] [0.022]
0.063*** - 0.277*** 0.295***
[0.007] [0.016] [0.008]
0.241*** - 0.089*** 0.028**
[0.029] [0.026] [0.013]
0.585*** 0.719** -0.166 0.297***




20845 12789 4121 17411
0.719 0.602 0.658 0.777
Log Fixed Capital
Log Employment X FDI
Log Employment









Log Employment X FDI
Log Employment








Table 8. Education and Direct Effects of Foreign Participation
Panel A: Bottom 1/3 of regions by share of people with secondary education
Panel B: Top 1/3 of regions by share of people with secondary education
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%;  robust standard errors in brackets  
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Russia Ukraine Poland Romania
-0.230 -2.912 -0.352 0.114
[0.327] [2.440] [0.490] [0.331]
0.051 0.750 0.016 0.027
[0.153] [0.509] [0.120] [0.101]
0.006 0.060 -0.043
[0.089] [0.068] [0.055]
yes yes yes yes
6339 4773 1108 3200
19172 13378 2502 13078
0.145 0.302 0.191 0.537
Russia Ukraine Poland Romania
-0.277 4.148* 0.026 -0.105
[0.676] [2.405] [0.473] [0.263]
0.412*** -0.964* -0.410** -0.033
[0.149] [0.506] [0.172] [0.086]
-0.244*** - 0.300*** 0.046
[0.093] [0.116] [0.044]
yes yes yes yes
6670 4501 1367 3099
19869 12448 3183 13020
0.166 0.361 0.253 0.580
Log Fixed Capital X FDI DENSITY
Log Employment X FDI DENSITY
FDI DENSITY
Dependent variable: Log Value Added
Table 9. Education and Spillover Effects of Foreign Participation
Panel A: Bottom 1/3 of regions by share of people with secondary education
yes yes
Log Employment X Sector yes yes yes yes
Year and Firm Fixed Effects




Log Fixed Capital X FDI DENSITY
Log Employment X FDI DENSITY
FDI DENSITY
Dependent variable: Log Value Added
Panel B: Top 1/3 of regions by share of people with secondary education
Log Employment X Sector yes yes yes yes
yes - yes yes
N observations
N groups
Year and Firm Fixed Effects
Log Fixed Capital X Sector
R2
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%;  robust standard errors in brackets  
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Log Fixed Capital X Sector yes yes
Log Employment X Sector
Year and Firm Fixed Effects
N groups
N observations
Dependent variable: Log Value Added
FDI DENSITY
Log Employment X FDI DENSITY







Log Fixed Capital X FDI
Log Fixed Capital
Log Employment X FDI
Log Employment
Dependent variable: Log Value Added
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Russia Ukraine Poland Romania
0.712*** 0.983*** 0.285 0.606***
[0.067] [0.080] [0.335] [0.064]
0.254*** 0.002 0.006 0.088***
[0.059] [0.030] [0.128] [0.030]
-0.250 0.082 -0.669 -0.526***
[0.437] [0.466] [1.445] [0.175]
yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yes
5038 5349 1499 6832
7938 11912 2902 21715
7.80 9.41 5.26 6.62
(0.453) (0.009) (0.730) (0.578)
-6.09 -10.09 -1.24 -9.42
(0.000) (0.000) (0.213) (0.000)
-0.93 - -1.36 0.77
(0.352) - (0.173) (0.442)
Russia Ukraine Poland Romania
0.717*** 0.981*** 0.361 0.598***
[0.066] [0.081] [0.285] [0.065]
0.248*** -0.002 -0.022 0.108***
[0.057] [0.030] [0.110] [0.033]
0.246 -0.323 -0.338 -1.052***
[0.359] [0.585] [1.166] [0.308]
-1.404 0.586 -0.040 0.686***
[1.080] [0.528] [0.669] [0.235]
yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yes
5038 5349 1499 6832
7938 11912 2902 21715
11.25 10.34 8.66 14.74
(0.508) (0.016) (0.731) (0.256)
-6.08 -10.07 -1.67 -9.32
(0.000) (0.000) (0.095) (0.000)
-0.69 - -1.40 0.76
(0.491) - (0.161) (0.448)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; robust st.errors in brackets; p-values in parentheses
Notes: TFP and FDI DENSITY are assumed endogenous and instrumented by lags (starting from the third lag)
Arellano-Bond AR(2) Test
Panel A: Basic specification
Table 12. Dynamic Specification with FDI TFP and FDI DENSITY
Region Dummies






















Hansen Chi2 Overid Test
Arellano-Bond AR(1) Test
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Russia Ukraine Poland Romania
0.940*** - 0.939*** 0.753***
[0.038] - [0.159] [0.028]
-0.002 - 0.311* 0.075*
[0.004] - [0.161] [0.044]
-0.079 - -3.488** -0.596**
[0.150] - [1.664] [0.272]
yes - yes yes
yes - yes yes
yes - yes yes
5043 - 1506 6861
7947 - 2913 21948
19.36 - 3.41 10.94
(0.013) - (0.906) (0.205)
-4.88 - -3.07 -12.05
(0.000) - (0.002) (0.000)
-1.00 - -1.48 -0.17
(0.317) - (0.140) (0.867)
Russia Ukraine Poland Romania
0.935*** - 0.920*** 0.752***
[0.038] - [0.172] [0.029]
-0.003 - 0.288* 0.129**
[0.004] - [0.163] [0.053]
0.129 - -3.344* -1.638***
[0.205] - [1.922] [0.587]
-0.731** - 0.238 1.123**
[0.365] - [1.686] [0.474]
yes - yes yes
yes - yes yes
yes - yes yes
5043 - 1506 6861
7947 - 2913 21948
23.22 - 4.12 12.35
(0.026) - (0.981) (0.418)
-4.87 - -3.04 -12.19
(0.000) - (0.002) (0.000)
-0.84 - -1.43 -0.23
(0.401) - (0.153) (0.821)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; robust st.errors in brackets; p-values in parentheses






Hansen Chi2 Overid Test
Lagged FDI DENSITY




Dependent variable: Log K/L
Lagged Log K/L
Lagged FDI TFP
Panel B: Specification with threshold effects
N groups
N observations






Dependent variable: Log K/L
Lagged Log K/L
Lagged FDI TFP
Table 13. Dynamic Specification for Capital-Labor Ratios
Panel A: Basic specification
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Hansen Chi2 Overid Test
Arellano-Bond AR(1) Test
Arellano-Bond AR(2) Test















Hansen Chi2 Overid Test
Arellano-Bond AR(1) Test
 